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The mass media and Russia’s ‘sphere of interests’: 
Mechanisms of regional hegemony in Belarus and Ukraine 
Joanna Szostek 
Royal Holloway University 
ABSTRACT: As conduits for ideas, values and geographical knowledge, the mass media 
contribute to the construction of regional order. Moscow-based media organisations with 
audiences in post-Soviet republics have been described as ‘soft power tools’ or ‘information 
weapons’ which aid the Russian state in its pursuit of regional dominance. However, a heavy 
focus on the agency of the Russian state obscures the important role that local actors and their 
motives often play in delivering Russian media content to large audiences in neighbouring 
countries. This article examines several major news providers which export content from 
Russia to Belarus and Ukraine, reaching large audiences thanks to partnerships that serve 
particular local interests and accommodate some local sensitivities. These news providers 
resemble mechanisms of neo-Gramscian regional hegemony, where actors in the ‘periphery’ 
are involved in perpetuating norms from the ‘centre’. The article argues that Russia’s political 
leadership, despite promoting consensual hegemony as its preferred regional order, has in fact 
undermined the type of media mechanisms that might have helped to sustain such an order. 
As the Russian state has projected narratives without regard for negative local reactions, it has 
made itself more reliant on coercive means to secure its declared ‘sphere of interests’ across 
formerly Soviet territory. 
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In November 2013, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko issued a strongly-
worded plea for Europe to help his country ‘escape’ from Russia’s orbit. Moscow is 
ready to use ‘whatever means to maintain a sphere of influence’, he wrote in the 
Financial Times, and Ukraine risked receding into ‘a secondary state-like formation’ if 
Russia succeeded in its geopolitical game.1 Yushchenko’s words suggest that a sphere 
of influence equates to the unjust, morally unacceptable denial of sovereignty to a 
weaker state by a more powerful one – a view which is shared by many contemporary 
commentators.2  
Russian leaders have never hidden their desire to maintain or increase their influence 
in the post-Soviet republics. In the 1990s the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) was already identified as the territory where Russia’s ‘vital interests’ (жизненные 
интересы, zhiznennyye interesy) were concentrated; preventing damage to these 
interests was explicitly prioritised.3 During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russia’s 
neighbours were famously described as its ‘traditional sphere of interests’ 
(традиционная сфера интересов, traditsionnaya sfera interesov) by then president 
Dmitriy Medvedev, who pledged to ‘work very attentively’ (очень внимательно 
работать, ochen vnimatelno rabotat) in these states as part of his five principles of 
foreign policy.4 
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The Russian claim to a sphere of interests sounds a lot like a claim to a sphere of 
influence.5 It has certainly been interpreted in that sense, pejoratively, by Western 
observers. Yet the establishment of a sphere of influence has not been publicly 
acknowledged as a goal by Russian policy-makers. The Moscow-centred regional order 
envisioned in so many Russian policy statements is never based explicitly on control 
and restrictions of sovereignty, but rather on ‘natural mutual gravity’,6 arising from 
‘very close kinship of souls’ (очень близкое родство душ, ochen blizkoye rodstvo 
dush).7 In other words, Russian official discourse suggests that the post-Soviet 
republics and their citizens should welcome Russia’s leadership on integration as a 
means to preserve the valuable ‘cultural and civilizational inheritance’ (культурно-
цивилизационное наследие, kulturno-tsivilizatsionnoye naslediye) that supposedly 
unites the region.8 In such a context, Russian regional influence, even dominance, 
would be rendered legitimate (and hence not a ‘sphere of influence’ in the pejorative 
sense) by the consent of everyone involved.9 
Russia’s ambition to lead its neighbours through natural gravity, without need for 
coercion, brings popular geopolitics into play. Popular geopolitics refers to collective 
understandings of places and peoples and their social construction via the media and 
popular culture.10 Studies of popular geopolitics have traditionally drawn attention to 
(and questioned) the ‘taken-for-granted geographical reasoning’ that occurs in the 
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content of movies, cartoons, video games, magazines, newspapers and other media 
formats.11 It is argued that such reasoning can serve to legitimize the imagined 
boundaries that position a country’s collective self in relation to friendly or hostile 
others.12 Scholars writing about popular geopolitics regularly look at media discourse, 
visuals and audiences in particular national settings.13 However, media content is often 
produced, disseminated and consumed across national borders – this is certainly true 
in the post-Soviet region, where media companies based in Moscow enjoy substantial 
transnational reach. The structures and interests which sustain cross-border media 
partnerships are not a traditional concern for scholars of popular geopolitics, yet the 
logic of popular geopolitics suggests that they might be significant for the regional and 
international order. 
In most of the former Soviet republics, substantial numbers of citizens understand the 
Russian language, follow Russian celebrities, attend the Russian Orthodox Church or 
retain fond memories of the Soviet era when Russia was part of their homeland. The 
Russian state bases its hopes for legitimate regional leadership on such cultural ties 
generating sentiments of attachment in ‘target’ countries. This accounts for Russia’s 
emphasis on ‘cultural-humanitarian cooperation’ (культурно-гуманитарное 
сотрудничество, kulturno-gumanitarnoye sotrudnichestvo), including support for 
Russian language learning, cultural exchanges and the free flow of media content from 
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Moscow to regional audiences.14 Among analysts of post-Soviet politics, the regional 
impact of the Russian media has attracted particular attention. Russian media are 
described as ‘soft power tools’ or ‘information weapons’ wielded by the Kremlin – 
sometimes to adverse, disruptive effect.15  
Russia’s political leadership undoubtedly instrumentalises the media in pursuit of both 
domestic and foreign policy goals.16 However, the purpose of this article is to look 
beyond the agency of the Russian state and highlight the facilitating role played by 
other, local actors in disseminating Russian media content within the post-Soviet 
region. It will be argued that these local actors and their interests have been integral to 
the process by which Russian norms, ideas and geographical knowledge have been 
delivered to mass regional audiences. The collaboration of actors in the ‘periphery’ in 
perpetuating norms from the ‘centre’ fits a model of regional neo-Gramscian 
hegemony.17 In the Gramscian tradition, mass media are considered an institution 
which facilitates non-coercive dominance by propagating norms and ideas that 
undergird an established hierarchy of power. 
The first part of the article draws on interviews conducted in 2011–2012 with the 
managers, editors and senior journalists of major media organisations that 
import/export news content from Russia to Ukraine and Belarus. The interviews 
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identify ‘demand-side’ factors which have traditionally sustained the presence of 
Russian news products in the media landscapes of Ukraine and Belarus, from common 
identities and the appeal of Russian celebrities among audiences to the material 
interests of Ukrainian businesspeople and the Belarusian state. 
The second part of the article situates the interview findings in the context of changes 
to media regulation and the media environment which have occurred in Ukraine and 
Belarus during the past decade, up to the most recent period of conflict in Ukraine. By 
tracing the trajectory of Russian access to audiences in the two countries, the article 
demonstrates how the media’s ability to convey ideas and norms from an aspiring 
regional hegemon to mass audiences in neighbouring states depends on 
accommodation of local sensitivities. Collaborating with local actors helps Russian 
media organizations to reach larger audiences than they would otherwise, but it also 
obliges them to accept limits on the narratives they disseminate. Recent experience 
suggests that when these limits are ignored, the outcome is often curtailment of 
access to the media market. Thus, when Russian media organisations have transmitted 
aggressive Kremlin-formulated narratives across borders without any regard for 
negative local reactions, it has undermined relationships and partnerships on which 
Russian hopes for ‘consensual’ regional hegemony depend. This leaves Russia more 
reliant on coercion to secure its regional ambitions.18 
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The article proceeds by briefly reviewing the literature on regional hegemony and 
elaborating on the idea that mass media are a mechanism via which regional 
hegemonic order can be reinforced. It then provides some contextual information 
about the Belarusian and Ukrainian media environments, introduces the news 
providers included in the empirical study, and presents findings from the interviews. 
The penultimate section explains how Russian media organizations have lost audience 
access when they have projected narratives without regard for negative local 
responses, particularly in Ukraine since 2014. A final, concluding section summarises 
the implications of this analysis for understandings of the media’s role in the workings 
of regional influence and the nature of the post-Soviet regional order. 
Regional hegemony and the media: theories and concepts 
Hegemony is a contested concept in International Relations (IR). Prys identifies six 
different IR approaches to the phenomenon of hegemony – neorealism, the Theory of 
Hegemonic Stability (THS), long-cycle theories, world-system approaches, neo-
Gramscianism and liberal hegemony theories.19 Neorealism and THS share a 
materialist foundation in presenting hegemony as the ‘direct consequence of an 
asymmetrical distribution of power’, whereas the latter four approaches allow space 
for conscious decision-making and ideational dynamics.20 Prys cites Sassoon to put 
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forward a consensus definition of hegemony as being ‘a political order (whether global 
or regional) in which the hegemon’s mode of thinking becomes dominant without a 
regular reference to violence’.21 To render the concept more amenable to application 
at the regional level she situates hegemony on a continuum between ‘domination’ on 
the one hand (when a central state commands and extracts involuntary contributions 
from secondary states under a constant threat of force) and ‘detachment’ on the other 
(when the central state is focused on domestic or global politics, not the regional 
periphery). 
Hegemony (whether regional or global) is better understood as a form of political 
order than as a ‘strategy’, as sometimes occurs.22 To call it a strategy of the central 
state obscures the fact that hegemony depends as much on responses at the periphery 
as on decisions made at the centre. This is one of the main insights of the Gramscian 
perspective: that hegemony is achieved at least partly by consensual means, when a 
leading class  
‘universalizes… its norms and values, thereby establishing a political and ethical 
harmony between dominant and subordinate groups. A dominant class rules, but 
effectively with and over, rather than against, subaltern classes.’23  
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Hegemony, as Cronin contends, ‘is not an attribute of a particular country, but rather it 
is a type of relationship that exists among a group of countries’.24 
Hopf argues, following Gramsci, that hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that 
hegemonic ideas – those which advance the interests of the hegemon in the language 
of universal interests – become taken for granted by the dominated population.25 
Hegemonic orders are therefore reproduced not only through economic and security 
institutions or the persuasion of elites, but also via  
‘the myriad interactions that occur among states and their citizens in cultural, 
educational, and informational sites… [including] university and graduate 
education, cultural productions, mediascapes, tourism, and other structures of 
ideational exchange and contact.’26 
This account of how hegemony becomes established bears some resemblance to Nye’s 
account of ‘soft power’, or power through ‘attraction’.27 Kearn asserts that soft power 
‘is most likely to be relevant in the presence of a hegemonic power, as it provides the 
ideational basis for the hegemon’s perceived legitimacy’.28 
Nye’s writings on soft power are criticised for lacking theoretical clarity,29 so the most 
recent publications on the topic seek to rework the concept and address its limitations. 
Feklyunina, for example, proposes an interpretation of soft power based on the 
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reception of narratives.30 Her analysis underlines the agency of audiences, which are 
‘far from passive recipients of transmitted messages’ and liable to arrive at varying 
interpretations of narratives projected from abroad. However, there has not yet been 
sufficient recognition that the media which transmit narratives can have agency too. 
Many media organizations are far from being passive conveyers of messages; they may 
filter the narratives projected from one state to another to different degrees and in 
different ways. 
The empirical contribution of this article is to highlight some of the lesser-studied 
actors, interests and complexities involved in the transmission of ideas via the media 
from a regional power to its less powerful neighbours. Acharya has called for regional 
worlds to be explored in their full diversity and interconnectedness.31 The following 
sections address interconnectedness in the post-Soviet region’s media industry and 
explain how and why certain connections have been sustained or broken. 
‘Dual-national’ news providers within the media environments of Ukraine and 
Belarus 
The media environments of Belarus and Ukraine have evolved in very different 
directions since the two countries acquired independence in 1991. Soon after 
Aleksandr Lukashenko became president of Belarus in 1994, he began to clamp down 
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on freedom of speech, placing loyal appointees in key editorial positions and 
developing highly restrictive legislation which makes it difficult for independent news 
providers to operate.32 For over 20 years, tightly controlled state-owned news outlets 
have therefore dominated the Belarusian media environment – particularly television, 
which is where most Belarusian citizens obtain their news.33 Belarusian TV viewers 
require a satellite dish to access channels with news programmes that are not 
controlled by their government. Belsat, a Polish-funded, Belarusian-language satellite 
broadcaster, appears to be the only TV channel that has substantially chipped into the 
state’s news monopoly: it claims to have over 750,000 viewers (based on 2017 survey 
data).34 The majority of Belarusians (over 60 per cent) can also get news online, where 
greater pluralism can be found. However, state-owned telecommunications firm 
Beltelecom controls international data transfers and can thus cut access to foreign 
websites when required; the state also has the ability and legal authority to block 
critical domestic websites, which it has done on multiple occasions.35 
The media environment in Ukraine is dominated by competing business interests 
rather than the state. As in Belarus, television is the most commonly used news 
medium. Ukrainian TV viewers can choose from numerous channels that belong to 
different Ukrainian ‘oligarchs’ and politicians (non-Russian foreign channels are 
available via cable but have negligible audiences). During certain periods, such as the 
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second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma,36 the state authorities have exerted 
substantial pressure on editorial policy at the leading TV channels. The top channels 
are also known for engaging in self-censorship and tendentious reporting, particularly 
on issues that concern their owners’ financial interests. Yet, online and print news 
organisations (such as Ukrayinska Pravda at Pravda.com.ua, and Zerkalo Nedeli at 
ZN.ua) have been providing good-quality journalism for many years, becoming more 
numerous over time, and Ukrainian legislation has generally been far more conducive 
to media freedom than legislation in Belarus. 
Belarus and Ukraine thus constitute starkly different operating environments for 
Russian media organisations. Until 2014, Ukrainian legislation allowed Russian media 
companies greater leeway to operate without censorship than autocratic Belarus. 
However, Russian media organisations faced more substantial competition in Ukraine 
than in Belarus, because Ukrainian domestic broadcasters were able to develop strong 
production standards with investment from their wealthy oligarch owners. Belarus and 
Ukraine have also followed quite different trajectories in their bilateral relations with 
Russia, which has had ramifications for Russian access to their media environments. 
President Lukashenko has consistently supported the idea of Russia and Belarus being 
‘fraternal nations’ (братские народы, bratskiye narody). Despite regular public spats 
with the Russian leadership about gas prices and oil imports, he has signed up willingly 
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to Russia’s various integration projects for the post-Soviet space. Ukrainian leaders, in 
contrast, have always been warier of Russian calls to integrate. Until the Orange 
revolution in 2004, Ukrainian foreign policy was marked by inertia and rhetorical ‘flip-
flopping’ between the Russian/Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic vectors.37 The period 2005–
2009 saw a sharp deterioration in Russian–Ukrainian relations, which only ended with 
the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010. Yanukovych was initially 
amenable to many demands from Moscow, but even he stalled on taking Ukraine into 
the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union; instead, he first pursued and then 
backtracked on an Association Agreement with the European Union, with fateful 
consequences.38 
Despite the differing political and commercial challenges of operating in Belarus and 
Ukraine, Russian media organisations have managed to maintain a high-profile 
presence in both countries. Media outlets in the post-Soviet republics which publish or 
broadcast news under Russian brand-names tend to be described in broad-brush 
terms as ‘Russian media’.39 However, some apparently ‘Russian’ channels and 
publications with large regional audiences could better be described as ‘dual-national’ 
media. Leading Russian broadcasters and publishers (both state and commercial) have 
entered into partnerships with local entities (both state and commercial) in order to 
deliver and sometimes tailor their products to viewers and readers in the post-Soviet 
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republics. Seven high-profile ‘dual-national’ media are listed in Table 1 (five cases from 
Belarus) and Table 2 (two cases from Ukraine);40 these media are the main focus of 
empirical attention in this article. All of them export news content from Moscow under 
major Russian brands names. 
Table 1: ‘Dual-national’ news providers in Belarus  
Title Description 
Vremya (Время, Time) 
news bulletin on ONT TV 
channel 
The flagship evening news bulletin of Russian state broadcaster Pervyy 
Kanal (Первый Канал, First Channel), shown in Belarus on Belarusian 
state channel ONT. ONT shows Vremya immediately before its own news 
programme Nashi Novosti (Наши Новости, Our News) as part of a single 
news hour which enjoys high ratings. Vremya dates back to the Soviet 
era, when it was beamed to massive audiences across the length and 
breadth of the USSR.  
Vesti (Вести, News) news 
bulletin on RTR-Belarus TV 
channel 
The flagship evening news bulletin of Russian state broadcaster Rossiya 
1, shown in Belarus on Belarusian state channel RTR-Belarus. The latter 
was established in 2008 as a partnership between VGTRK (a Russian state 
holding company) and Minsk city government channel STV. 
Segodnya (Сегодня, 
Today) news bulletin on 
NTV-Belarus TV channel 
The flagship evening news bulletin of Russian state-aligned broadcaster 
NTV, shown in Belarus on Belarusian state channel NTV-Belarus. The 
latter began broadcasting in 2006 when Belteleradiokompaniya (the 
Belarusian National Broadcasting Company) was granted the rights to 
transmit NTV programmes. The programme schedule of NTV-Belarus 
usually differs very little from that of NTV. 
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Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Belorussii 
(Комсомольская Правда 
в Белоруссии, Komsomol 
Truth in Belorussia) 
A mass-circulation daily newspaper which carries human interest and 
celebrity news alongside some socio-political stories. Owned and run as a 
subsidiary by Russian publishing house Komsomolskaya Pravda, which 
belongs to pro-Kremlin businessmen. Editors in Minsk take some content 
from the Russian parent newspaper but produce the majority locally. The 
original Komsomolskaya Pravda began life in 1925 as the mouthpiece of 
the Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth). 
Argumenty i Fakty v 
Belorussii (Аргументы и 
Факты в Белоруссии, 
Arguments and Facts in 
Belorussia) 
A mass-circulation weekly newspaper, tabloid in format but tending to 
write more about everyday problems than celebrity gossip. Owned and 
run as a subsidiary by Russian publishing house Argumenty i Fakty, which 
was owned by Russian billionaire brothers Aleksey and Dmitriy Ananyev 
as part of their Media3 holding until being sold to the Moscow municipal 
government in 2014. Editors in Minsk take some content from the 
Russian Argumenty i Fakty (AiF) but produce the majority locally. AiF 
began life in 1978 as a weekly bulletin published by Znaniye (Знания, 
Knowledge), a society which organized public educational lectures 
throughout the USSR.  
Table 2: ‘Dual national’ news providers in Ukraine 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Ukraine (Комсомольская 
Правда в Украине, 
Komsomol Truth in 
Ukraine) 
A mass-circulation daily newspaper which carries human interest and 
celebrity news alongside some socio-political stories. Run as a franchise 
of Russian publishing house Komsomolskaya Pravda, it belongs to 
Ukrainian Media Holding (UMH). UMH was owned by its founder, 
Ukrainian entrepreneur Boris Lozhkin, until being sold in 2013 to Serhiy 
Kurchenko’s VETEK group. Kurchenko is a Ukrainian businessman 
associated with the circle (‘family’) of (now exiled) President Viktor 
Yanukovych. 
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Argumenty i Fakty v 
Ukraine (Аргументы и 
Факты в Украине, 
Arguments and Facts in 
Ukraine) 
A mass-circulation weekly newspaper, tabloid in format but tending to 
write more about everyday problems than celebrity gossip. Run as a 
franchise of Russian publishing house Argumenty i Fakty, it belongs to 
Ukrainian Media Holding (see information on Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Ukraine, above). 
The dual-national news providers listed here are far from being the only conduits 
carrying news content from Russia into Ukraine and Belarus. Most notably, Ukrainian 
and Belarusian internet users get news from countless Russian websites and social 
media platforms (an issue discussed further in the final section); Russian TV channels 
are also available via satellite in both countries and until 2014 Ukrainians could access 
Russian TV channels via cable networks too. However, the ‘dual-national’ news 
providers merit attention due to their particularly substantial market shares. The four 
tabloids have been among the most popular news publications on the Ukrainian and 
Belarusian markets for many years, up to the time of writing.41 The news bulletins are 
broadcast by three leading TV channels in Belarus with nationwide reach, so they are 
accessible to the majority of the Belarusian population. NTV-Belarus was reportedly 
among the top three news sources for 45 per cent of Belarusians in 2011; RTR-Belarus 
– for 30 per cent of Belarusians; and ONT (which broadcasts the Russian news bulletin 
Vremya just before its own bulletin, Nashi Novosti) – for 63 per cent of Belarusians.42 
They were thus three of the top four TV news providers in the country. A more recent 
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poll in September 2014 found that around 36 per cent of Belarusians were watching 
Russian TV news programmes ‘regularly’ and a further 49 per cent were watching 
them ‘sometimes’.43 Such high viewing figures for Russian news programmes would 
not be possible if the Russian broadcasters had not established partnerships with their 
Belarusian counterparts. 
Semi-structured, individual, face-to-face interviews were conducted by the author with 
one or two senior representatives from each of the listed news providers in Moscow 
(3), Minsk (6) and Kyiv (2) in 2011–2012. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes 
and an hour and all were conducted in Russian. In general, there was a high level of 
willingness to participate in the research. Some interviewees spoke on the record but 
two interviews have been anonymized. The interviewees’ comments should be 
considered personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the official position of their 
respective media organizations. 
Russian TV news on Belarusian state channels: a popular, profitable arrangement 
The three TV news bulletins Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya are all produced in Moscow 
and their content is determined with input from Russian state officials.44 The managers 
of ONT, RTR-Belarus and NTV-Belarus, which broadcast the bulletins in Belarus, have 
no influence over the composition of the bulletins at the production stage. They can 
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only affect the shape of the bulletins through censorship – by cutting out certain news 
reports prior to broadcast on Belarusian airwaves. 
In the vast majority of cases, the bulletins go out on the Belarusian channels in their 
full original form. Millions of Belarusian households therefore receive the same 
narrative about Russia and the world as Russian households do. The narrative 
conveyed via Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya is formulated and projected strategically by 
Russia’s political leadership;45 it depicts a world where most problems can be traced 
back to aggressive American unilateralism. The fact that a majority of Belarusians and 
Russians share frequent and long-term exposure to this narrative is likely to support 
convergence in their perceptions of global threats and of the norms and values which 
require defending.46 
Even during times of political tension between Moscow and Minsk, transmission of 
Russian state TV news on Belarusian state TV channels does not cease. In 2010 a so-
called ‘information war’ broke out, with Russian broadcasters generating some very 
negative reports about President Lukashenko.47 Yet no attempt was made to remove 
Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya from the schedule of ONT, RTR-Belarus and NTV-Belarus. 
Instead, a handful of critical Russian reports were removed prior to broadcast and 
 19  
Belarusian journalists were given the task of ‘responding’ to Russian verbal attacks 
with the Belarusian (official) point of view.48 
What sustains the transmission of Russian news via these ‘dual national’ media 
organizations, even during times of tension when Russian narratives are criticising the 
Belarusian leadership? The first explanation is audience demand, which some of the 
interviewees attributed to a common identity shared by Russians and Belarusians. 
ONT’s director of programming Olga Yakimenko said that a majority of viewers 
considered Russia and Belarus to be one country because of ‘the long Soviet past, 
friendly ties and relations, and the fact that many have relatives and living in Russia’. 
She added that ONT had never considered dropping Vremya from the schedule 
because ‘viewers would be upset if it was taken off air’.49 
A second and related factor which explains the continued rebroadcasting of the 
Russian-made bulletins is the financial benefit accruing to the Belarusian state 
broadcasters. The Russian-made news bulletins have high ratings in Belarus, which 
means they attract high advertising revenues. Sergey Bulatskiy, director of NTV-
Belarus, said the channel was ‘a commercial project above all’ which was profitable 
thanks to the large audiences attracted by Russian content.50 The Russian bulletins also 
allow the Belarusian channels to economize on the production costs of their own news 
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bulletins. The latter are able to run relatively few foreign news reports involving 
expensive foreign correspondents, because they can rely on the Russian channels to do 
such work for them. Bulatskiy pointed out that Belteleradiokompaniya lacked a 
network of permanent foreign correspondents due to financial constraints. ‘Russia has 
far more’, he said, adding that Belarusian viewers probably turned to the Russian news 
bulletins to learn about international events, as well as events in Russia. Ruslan 
Poddubskiy, head of news at ONT, said the channel’s Nashi Novosti bulletin had 
‘Moscow assistants, so to speak’ for reporting big events in Russia or the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).51 Usually, Belarusian broadcasters only 
send correspondents to foreign events involving the Belarusian president or clear 
Belarusian interests.  
‘Dual-national’ tabloids: A balancing act between Moscow and officials or readers  
At the ‘dual-national’ tabloids, staff in Minsk and Kyiv have responsibility for their own 
daily editorial decisions. Unlike the ‘dual-national’ TV channels described above, the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian editions of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty 
produce most of their content locally. The proportion of Russian-made content varies; 
sometimes it is less than a quarter and it is never more than half. Flattering stories 
about the Russian leadership and its actions do not dominate these tabloids in the 
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same way as the TV bulletins. At Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine, for example, a 
journalist said that Russia and Ukraine had ‘recognized themselves as sovereign 
states’, so ‘information about Ukraine comes first… our political and economic 
situation is the priority’.52 An interviewee at Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii said that 
readers were most interested in ‘things that affect their lives, their region’, noting that 
Moscow was ‘rather far away’.53 
The dual-national tabloids are not therefore conduits for the Russian state’s strategic 
narrative in the same way as Vremya, Segodnya and Vesti. Nevertheless, certain 
aspects of their content promote or reinforce identity ties with Russia among their 
Ukrainian and Belarusian readerships. Requirements imposed by the Komsomolskaya 
Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty publishing houses mean that the tabloids’ Ukrainian and 
Belarusian editors are strongly inclined to play down political tensions between 
Moscow and Kyiv/Minsk. The coordinator of Komsomolskaya Pravda’s international 
operations explained that the Russian publishing house would not allow any ‘filth’ 
(гадости, gadosti) about Russia to be printed in foreign editions.54 A deputy editor 
working with Argumenty i Fakty regional supplements said: ‘We rely on common sense 
– people understand that they are working at Argumenty i Fakty, not some other 
newspaper.’55 External control over content at these papers is thus exercised tacitly, 
based on internalized norms and expectations. The outcome is content in which Russia 
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is generally portrayed as benign, and any difficulties in bilateral relations are depicted 
as resolvable rather than caused by fundamentally incompatible interests. 
In Belarus, editors described ignoring bilateral tensions or reporting them ‘neutrally’ in 
order to balance conflicting pressures – from Moscow partners on the one hand, and 
the authoritarian Belarusian government on the other. The interviewee at Argumenty i 
Fakty v Belorussii said certain sensitive stories were avoided entirely due to the paper’s 
‘complicated’ position’. ‘Both sides are ours’ (и те и те свои, i te i te svoi), she said, so 
if they have to report a contentious story about bilateral relations they avoid 
supporting one country over the other.56 Similarly, the interviewee from 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii said: 
‘In everything concerning the state, we try not to enter into a conflict... If 
there are some very important things, we simply present them in a factual 
tone: here’s one point of view, here’s another. Here’s one Russian quote, 
here’s a Belarusian one.’57 
In Ukraine, the interviewee from Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine said reporting on 
bilateral relations with Russia could be ‘very difficult’ given the sometimes 
contradictory views of Ukrainian readers and the Moscow head office.58 Her comments 
indicated that the paper generally ended up acknowledging any obvious tensions, but 
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playing down their significance. If the tabloids’ readers internalise this message that 
any tensions with Russia are temporary and resolvable, there is less reason for them to 
resist the prospect of a Russia-led regional order. 
Interviewees attributed the continued popularity of the Russian tabloid brands partly 
to their coverage of everyday life (быт, byt) which transcends national boundaries. 
The interviewee from Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine, for example, said Ukrainian readers 
could identify with general ‘human’, ‘national’ (ethnic) or historical themes from 
Russia. The readers ‘still remember the Soviet Union’, so for them ‘Russia is not a 
separate state but part of the motherland [родина, rodina]’, she added.59 Argumenty i 
Fakty v Ukraine therefore regularly publishes stories about ordinary Russians and their 
problems. Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine took a slightly different approach in that 
it replaced ‘archetypal stories about life in Russia’ with equivalent stories about life in 
Ukraine. An interviewee from the paper said: 
‘The federal Komsomolskaya Pravda [Russian edition] has always been 
good at indirect political stories, stories about people and life situations 
that happen in the Russian provinces… the difficult life in some small mining 
town or village. You can find exactly the same situation in Ukraine – in 
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principle, that’s what we do… we prepare material from Ukraine in the 
same tone.’60 
When stories about everyday Russian life appear in the mass circulation tabloids, they 
may say nothing about foreign politics, but they do reinforce the idea that ordinary 
people in Russia are ‘like us’ from the perspective of Ukrainian and Belarusian readers 
– they are extensions of the ‘self’ rather than foreign ‘others’. Even when stories are 
transposed from a Russian context to a Ukrainian (or Belarusian) one, they reinforce 
shared understandings across the three countries of what everyday life entails, what is 
‘normal’ and what is problematic. 
Interest in Russian celebrities also drives sales of the ‘dual-national’ tabloids. ‘We see it 
clearly – when [Russian singer Alla] Pugacheva is on the cover, sales rise,’ said the 
journalist at Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine.61 
Belarusian and Ukrainian audience demand for content about the everyday problems 
of ‘post-Soviet’ existence and Russian popular culture means there are financial 
rewards available for importing it. In Ukraine, it was a businessman from Kharkiv, Boris 
Lozhkin, who pursued this money-making opportunity most actively and brought 
Ukrainian editions of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty to the market in 
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the late 1990s. Lozhkin has stressed in interviews that his decision to initiate business 
dealings with Russian publishing houses was motivated by profits, not politics: 
‘You have to understand the business-model. Argumenty i Fakty and 
Komsomolka had the biggest circulations back then. Consider: it’s a famous 
brand in Ukraine, you don’t have to pay for promotion. It’s in Russian, so 
no translation is necessary. Do you understand, this is complete 
effectiveness… When you launch publications like that, you don’t even 
think will it work or not, there is no risk at all.’62 
Lozhkin himself took no clear public position on matters of domestic or international 
politics until 2014, when he became head of the Presidential Administration for Petro 
Poroshenko. Unlike most other major media owners in Ukraine, he built his fortune on 
the high sales and advertising potential of his various media investments, rather than 
exploitation of their ‘political’ value.63 During the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan 
he claims his media took a ‘neutral’ position, a stance that was requested by his 
Russian partners but also ‘common sense’ from a sales perspective: 
‘The owners of the Russian brands which we publish here always asked us 
to take a balanced position regarding Russia. You know, without any anti-
Russian hysterics... But there couldn’t be such hysterics anyway. Because 
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Komsomolskaya Pravda is a newspaper of that part of Ukraine which is 
sympathetic towards Russia. Which means logically you have to take the 
same position in order not to irritate the reader.’64 
This statement is very much in line with the logic of neo-Gramscian hegemony: media 
reproduction of a worldview supporting Russian dominance is driven in a consensual 
process by interplay between ideational factors (values among the Ukrainian 
population) and material ones (the commercial interests of Ukrainian investors). 
In Belarus, the tabloids deliver profits back to Moscow, but profitability still appears to 
be the principal driving force behind their operations and editorial policy. As an 
interviewee from Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii put it:  
‘Komsomolka is a business project. However people judge it due to its name and 
shareholders, pro-Kremlin or whatever, it is still a business project. So, the 
shareholders’ interest lies in having a profitable business in Belarus, which 
operates in a stable way, with a growing readership, so the capital increases.’65 
The same interviewee stressed that the paper worked ‘above all in the interests of the 
reader, because the reader buys the paper every day and if we do not answer his 
questions he simply stops buying’. A sceptic might wonder whether Komsomolka’s 
Russian shareholders might also have political motives that were underplayed by 
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interviewee for reasons of normative acceptability – this cannot be ruled out. 
However, the environment in authoritarian Belarus is such that a high-profile politically 
motivated media business independent of the Belarusian authorities would be unlikely 
to survive very long. 
Unilateral projection of Russian media content and regional backlash 
The ‘dual national’ media organizations discussed above constitute mechanisms of 
hegemonic norm transmission that are propelled by demand and pecuniary interests in 
the ‘periphery’ as much as the political ambitions of the ‘centre’. However, other 
media outlets transmit Russian media content across borders with little or no local 
consent or facilitation. In an extreme example, the Russian military intervention in 
Crimea in 2014 led to the forcible seizure of broadcasting infrastructure and the 
displacement of Ukrainian channels by Russian ones. Russia’s main federal TV channels 
are independently broadcasting their international versions via satellite throughout 
the post-Soviet region without need for local consent or assistance, while the internet 
also allows Russian media companies to reach international audiences independently 
of local partners. The transmission of Russian channels via cable television – another 
important conduit for Russian news exports – does not involve ‘dual-national’ 
collaboration on the scale described in the previous section. However, local cable 
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companies must agree to carry the Russian channels in the packages they sell and they 
must abide by local legislation in doing so. 
The fate of Russian channels on Ukrainian and Belarusian cable networks provides a 
good illustration of the problems an aspiring hegemon may encounter if it projects 
narratives unilaterally without regard for negative reactions in the ‘peripheral’ states it 
hopes to influence. Cable networks in Ukraine and Belarus used to carry the 
international versions of Russian federal channels, and did so profitably. However, 
cable transmissions of the main Russian channels are now banned in both countries. In 
Belarus, the authorities stopped cable networks from carrying the international 
versions of Russia’s main channels in 2009.66 Content from Russian television has 
continued to be broadcast both via cable and terrestrially – but only on the Belarusian 
state-controlled channels, RTR-Belarus, NTV-Belarus and ONT. This arrangement gave 
the Belarusian authorities the ability to censor Russian content when needed and it 
was almost certainly put in place to defend against potential Russian ‘information 
attacks’, i.e. broadcasts criticising the Belarusian status quo. Critical material about 
Belarusian President Lukashenko was censored during the period of bilateral tensions 
in 2010, for example. Since the arrangement was introduced, the Russian state’s 
freedom to communicate with Belarusian citizens about domestic Belarusian politics 
has therefore been curtailed. 
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In Ukraine, the main Russian state channels were first banned from cable networks in 
2008 after they showed tendentious, misleading reports about political developments 
during the pro-Western presidency of Viktor Yushchenko.67 That ban turned out to be 
difficult to enforce and fairly short-lived, but new bans imposed since early 2014 have 
been more durable and comprehensive.68 Indeed, a whole raft of legislative and 
regulatory changes have been introduced in Ukraine since the ‘revolution of dignity’ 
(революція гідності, revolyutsiya hidnosti) to reduce consumption of all kinds of 
Russian media content, as Russian propaganda has officially been acknowledged as a 
major threat to national security.69 Banning cable transmissions of the main Russian 
federal channels was just the first step.70 Dozens of other Russian channels were later 
added to the cable blacklist;71 then the screening of Russian movies and TV series 
made since 2014 was banned as well.72 The rules that require high quotas of content 
on Ukrainian TV channels to be made in Europe have been changed, so that Russian-
made content no longer counts as European and is therefore being squeezed out of TV 
schedules.73 Broadcasters must also abide by new language quotas stipulating that 75 
per cent of content on all national TV channels must be in Ukrainian;74 there are 
similar but slightly lower Ukrainian language quotas for radio broadcasts. The National 
Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting has been given the power to impose hefty fines 
for infringements of these regulations. Most recently, sanctions have been imposed on 
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major Russian media companies including Yandex, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, VKontakte 
and the federal broadcasters; a presidential decree instructs Ukrainian internet 
providers to block their websites.75 Even book imports from Russia have been 
targeted.76 
It is not impossible for people in Ukraine to get around the abovementioned 
restrictions and access Russian media content. Satellite dishes still provide access to 
Russian television; website blocks can be bypassed using VPNs and anonymisers. Yet, 
the legislative and regulatory changes have certainly had an impact on media 
consumption. For example, survey data reported by the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors indicates that the weekly reach of RTR Planeta (the international version of 
Russian state channel Rossiya 1) in Ukraine fell from 18.7 per cent in 2012 to 8.8 per 
cent in 2014.77 By early 2017, the proportion of Ukrainians able to receive the main 
Russian federal channels had fallen to just 11–13 per cent (79 per cent of those who 
still had access were using satellite dishes and some people in the east could still get 
Russian channels via a terrestrial signal).78 Other surveys show a sharp deterioration in 
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russian media;79 by 2017 less than 2 per cent of 
Ukrainians said they trusted Russian TV reports about the conflict in Donbas.80 
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Thus, the Russian state’s tendency to heavy-handedly project narratives which offend 
local interests in ‘peripheral’ countries has undermined the capacity of Russian media 
organizations to reach audiences in those countries. In Belarus, day-to-day Russian 
access to audiences has been maintained, but the Belarusian authorities have 
developed quite effective tools to censor or block Russian content which they find 
objectionable. In Ukraine, most of the major media conduits that used to disseminate 
norms and ideas from Russia have suffered substantial long-term damage since 2014. 
Interestingly, the two ‘dual-national’ tabloids discussed above, Komsomolskaya Pravda 
v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine, are among the few ‘Russian’ outlets to 
have escaped the legislative clampdown. Their balancing act and accommodation of 
local sensitivities, described in the interviews from 2011–2012, appears to have 
continued and has probably protected them from the purge affecting other Russian 
media organisations on the Ukrainian market. 
Discussion: Media, regional influence and the post-Soviet regional order 
Gramsci understood the mass media as a mechanism via which hegemonic ideas are 
reproduced in society – an institution which can facilitate harmony between dominant 
and subordinate classes. This article has suggested that media organizations can 
sometimes perform a comparable function in supporting hegemonic order within a 
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region. The partnerships established by Russian broadcasters and publishers with local 
entities in Ukraine and Belarus have helped to disseminate content which portrays 
Russian power as benign, bilateral tensions as fleeting rather than fundamental, and 
ordinary Russians as similar to ordinary Ukrainians and Belarusians. If internalised, 
such content has the potential to reduce resistance to Russian regional leadership. 
The article has also argued that actors in the regional ‘periphery’ and their motives 
should be considered alongside the ambitions of the regional ‘centre’ to explain how 
and why the mass media reproduce hegemonic values. In Ukraine and Belarus, 
consumer demand and the pecuniary interests of the state and private investors have 
helped Russian media content to reach wide audiences. 
The ‘Russian’ media with audiences in the post-Soviet region are not homogeneous, 
however. Some media organizations with links to Moscow (such as the ‘dual-national’ 
tabloids) make allowances for sensitivities in neighbouring states and minimise 
contention to preserve their access. Other media organisations – particularly Russia’s 
federal TV channels – project contentious messages with little regard for negative 
reactions in the ‘periphery’. The latter approach has generated resistance and 
restrictions on information imports from Moscow which are likely, over the long term, 
 33  
to undermine the Russian leadership’s prospects of building a consensual hegemonic 
order in its regional neighbourhood. 
Russian influence via the mass media in the post-Soviet republics is a complex 
phenomenon. When ‘Russian’ media with regional audiences are labelled as ‘tools’ or 
‘weapons’ of the Kremlin, it obscures both the diversity of conduits via which Russian 
content is exported and the role of local actors in sustaining the content flow. 
Differentiating between Russian media organisations according to their mode of 
international operation – consensus-based partnerships versus unilateral projection – 
can contribute to a more nuanced view of the mechanics of Russian regional influence. 
It seems the Russian leadership has developed no coherent strategy for engaging the 
mass media in defence of its ‘sphere of interests’. In statements and policy documents, 
consensus-based regional hegemony is repeatedly depicted as the type of order to 
which Russia aspires; the potential of media exports to facilitate such an order is also 
recognised. Yet the tendentious and often inaccurate nature of the narrative projected 
via Russia’s state-controlled media is inflicting damage on the very mechanisms which 
have traditionally reproduced norms, ideas and geographical knowledge from 
Moscow. The approach to mediated communication adopted by Russian officials is 
leaving them more reliant on coercion to consolidate Russian leadership of the post-
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Soviet region. Domestic priorities (i.e. maintaining support for the president and 
government by inflating external threats) are the principal drivers of this approach. 
However, messages and content intended primarily for the Russian domestic audience 
cannot be concealed from audiences in the periphery, who often react negatively, to 
the detriment of Russian foreign policy interests. 
A limitation of this study is its reliance on a rather small number of interviews to 
explain the behaviour of the ‘dual-national’ news providers (it is possible that 
interviewees could not be fully open about political factors influencing their work). As 
always, further research would help to test the validity of the arguments presented. 
Additional avenues which merit investigation include the motivations of a wider range 
actors who help spread hegemonic ideas via the media, such as those in the 
entertainment industry. 
Another potential criticism of this study is that it focuses excessively on ‘traditional’ 
media organisations best known for their print and broadcast output (although it 
should be noted that all the media organisations discussed in the empirical section 
have an online presence too). For younger generations, social media – and the internet 
more generally – are increasingly important sources of news. Russian ‘influence 
operations’ on social networks have become a high-profile topic of global concern; 
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commentators are wondering whether Russia has ‘mastered’ social media platforms so 
well that it can now even swing elections in Western democracies.81 If Russia has 
indeed developed effective online techniques for manipulating foreign public opinion, 
one could perhaps argue that access to mass audiences via traditional media in places 
like Ukraine no longer matters very much for its foreign policy ambitions. There are, 
however, good grounds to be sceptical of such a view. Social media audiences are by 
their nature fragmented. Russian content disseminated via social media is more likely 
to circulate among small, sympathetic audiences than to reach the broad audiences of 
a familiar national tabloid or cable TV channel. By targeting a sympathetic minority 
with inflammatory social media messages, Russian communicators can hope to 
achieve some ‘disruption’, which is often said to be their aim.82 Yet an ability to disrupt 
neighbouring states by inciting minorities is not what Russia needs to achieve its vision 
of a hegemonic regional order. Rather, Russia needs the legitimacy that comes from 
mass popular acquiescence to Russian leadership. In Ukraine, the Russian state’s 
communicative tactics are not serving this goal at all.   
To conclude, cross-border media connections are an important feature of the twenty-
first century world which have implications for regional order, as the case of Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine has illustrated. However, it is insufficient to study regional 
influence via the media exclusively from the perspective of the dominant state’s 
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ambitions and agency. Rather, future analysis should pay due attention to the 
relationships and motives that sustain the transmission of media content across 
borders, from senders via deliverers to receivers. 
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